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Abstract 
We use China as a laboratory to test the effect of government quality on cash holdings. We 
build on, and extend, the existing literature on government expropriation and its interaction 
with firm-level agency problems by proposing a financial constraint mitigation argument. We 
find that firms hold less cash when local government quality is high, which is not consistent 
with the state expropriation argument, but supports the financial constraint mitigation argument. 
A good government lowers the investment sensitivity to cash flows and cash sensitivity to cash 
flows, decreases cash holdings more significantly in private firms, and improves access to bank 
and trade credit financing. We also test and find support for Stulz’s (2005) model on the 
interaction between government and firm agency problems.  
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1. Introduction 
Government shapes the corporate operating environment and its behaviors affect corporate 
financial decisions. We examine in this study whether the quality of governments affects 
corporate cash holdings (CCH). CCH (and liquidity in general) are strategically important 
because they can crucially affect a firm’s ability to maintain liquidity and to realize investment 
opportunities (Harford 1999; Campello et al., 2011). Cash is vulnerable to extraction by both 
external parties (e.g., the government, shareholders) and entrenched managers in the company 
(Myers and Rajan, 1998). It is therefore interesting to see how government quality and its 
interaction with the insider agency problem affect corporate cash holding decisions. In this 
paper, we follow Levine (2005) to define a good (or high quality) government as one that 
protects property rights by effective law and contract enforcement and refrains from 
expropriation.1 
Our study stands at the intersection of two literatures, namely, the law and finance 
literature and the corporate cash holding literature. Prior law and finance literature identifies 
government as a key institutional factor and reports that a good government promotes 
macroeconomic growth (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; La Porta, et al., 
1999; Beck and Laeven, 2006), and government policy changes affect stock market volatilities 
(Pástor and Veronesi, 2012). However, there is fairly limited research at the micro level on the 
role of government quality (and its interaction with managerial incentives) in shaping firm 
financial policies such as cash holding decisions despite Stulz’s (2005) “twin agency” 
argument.2 That is, in addition to company insiders’ (managers and controlling shareholders) 
expropriation of outside minority investors (i.e., the insider agency problem), the state also uses 
                                                             
1
 La Porta et al. (1999) have a broader definition of a good government that protects property rights, keeps 
regulations and taxes light, is clean and democratic, and provides efficient public services. We follow the narrower 
version of Levine (2005) as it is more closely linked to corporate cash holdings. 
 
2
 Gao and Yun (2011) reports that provision of public liquidity via the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
in the US improves firms' access to finance and helps them take advantage of growth options in the crisis period. 
Firth et al. (2013) find that local government spending hurts firm performance in China. Using a cross-country 
sample, Caprio et al. (2013) is the only study focusing on governmental extraction of CCH. Measuring political 
extraction risk by indexes on corruption, they find a negative relation between political extraction risk and firms’ 
cash holding.  
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discretionary powers to expropriate firms and their investors (i.e., the state agency problem).  
Given the importance of CCH, researchers have long been interested in understanding 
their economic determinants and implications. In addition to the transactional cost motive and 
the precautionary motive (see Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) for a review), agency 
costs of managerial discretion are identified as an important factor affecting the level of CCH. 
Jensen’s (1986) agency argument focuses on the shareholder-manager agency conflicts and 
predicts that when there is no effective monitoring, managers have incentives to use free cash 
flow to generate private benefits. As a result, shareholders discount the value of CCH in 
anticipation of such agency incentives. Some prior studies in the US provide evidence 
consistent with this argument (e.g., Harford, 1999; Harford et al., 2008; Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smit, 2007) although Bates et al. (2009) find that the increase in CCH in recent years is 
not ascribed to agency problems.  
Some researchers use cross-country data to understand how investor protection and related 
agency problems affect CCH. These studies, however, in general have three limitations. First, 
they mainly focus on shareholder rights granted by law and as a result, there is little evidence 
on how enforcement of investor protection affects CCH. This separation is nontrivial given that 
law on paper and enforcement can deviate significantly in many countries outside the US. 
Second, even for the effect of on-paper shareholder rights on cash holdings, the extant evidence 
is mixed. For example, in countries with weak shareholder rights, Dittmar et al. (2003) report 
that firms tend to hold more cash, and Pinkowitz et al. (2006) document that shareholders 
discount CCH more significantly. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find that the same shareholder 
rights index does not have a significant effect on CCH. Caprio et al. (2013), in contrast, show 
that it is positively related to CCH when using a UK legal origin dummy as a proxy for strong 
shareholder rights. On the other hand, Kusnadi and Wei (2011) report that investor protection 
has a first-order effect on CCH and firms hold less cash in response to cash flow increase when 
investor protection is strong. 
Third, these cross-country studies typically find it difficult to render good control for 
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firm-level agency problems (i.e., the insider agency problem in the terminology of Stulz (2005)) 
that are also important in cash holding decisions (Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). For instance, due 
to data limitation, Dittmar et al. (2003) only use a country-level family control to proxy for the 
insider agency problems. Lacking information on cash flow rights, Kalcheva and Lins (2007) 
measure firm-level agency problems by managerial control rights, and they are careful to note 
that this proxy mainly reflects insiders’ capability rather than incentive of expropriation. 
Kusnadi and Wei (2011) do not control for firm-level agency proxies. 
Our study takes a different approach to testing the effect of institutional quality on CCH by 
using a unique intra-country dataset outside the US. Focusing on a single country outside the 
US is crucial for the purposes of this study. First, we can have a cleaner test of the 
enforcement-component of investor protection on CCH by effectively holding shareholder 
rights conferred by law on paper constant (e.g., see Xu, 2011). Second, focusing on a single 
country outside the US makes it possible to directly test the interaction between the twin agency 
problems advanced by Stulz (2005) and its effect on corporate financial policies. The US is not 
an appropriate setting for testing the interaction between the twin agency problems given that in 
the US government expropriation is not a major issue. Nor a cross-country sample is ideal 
because it is difficult to come up with good firm-level agency proxies in international studies.  
Of course, a potential concern for using single-country data is that there might be limited 
variations in the quality of government and other institutions. We mitigate this concern by 
choosing China as a laboratory that is a large and diverse country with substantial disparity in 
the levels of economic and institutional development across different regions despite the same 
commercial laws on paper (Cull and Xu, 2005; Lin et al., 2010).  
Building on and extending the prior research, we hypothesize that a good government may 
affect CCH in three ways. First, a good government refrains from expropriating firms, and as a 
result firms can hold more cash with less fear over government extraction (i.e., the 
expropriation argument) (Caprio et al., 2013). This predicts a positive relation between 
government quality and CCH. The reasoning is as follows. Stulz (2005) notes that facing the 
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government expropriation risk, corporate insiders are likely to take actions to reduce 
expropriation by the state. Caprio et al. (2013) argue that one possible action is for firms to hold 
less liquid assets (i.e., cash and cash equivalents). This is because cash is difficult to trace and 
easy to convert to private consumption, and as a result, cash is more vulnerable to expropriation 
than illiquid tangible assets (e.g., property, plant, equipment, and inventory) (Myers and Rajan, 
1998). In addition, Svensson (2003) reports that (corrupt) government officials take account of 
firms’ ability to pay when deciding on how much bribery to ask for; as a result, the more a firm 
can pay, the more it must pay. This factor provides added incentives for firms to keep less cash 
to reduce government expropriation. Using 30,000 firms across 109 countries, Caprio et al. 
(2013) find that measures of political corruption are negatively related to corporate cash 
holdings, but positively related to tangible assets and dividend payouts. Using another sample, 
Kusnadi and Yang (2010) also find broadly similar results. Therefore, firms appear to shelter 
assets from state expropriation by keeping fewer liquid assets.  
Second, we propose that a good government may help relieve financial constraints facing 
firms and enable them to hold less cash for precautionary purposes (i.e., the financial constraint 
mitigation argument), which is largely overlooked by prior studies. Specifically, a good 
government better protects property rights by enforcing law/business contracts, thereby 
boosting banks’ confidence in lending as the chance of loan repayment and repossessing 
collateral increases (Ayyagari et al., 2010; Xu, 2011). Similarly, a good government will uphold 
contracts in business disputes and this enhances the credibility of business entities, thereby 
allowing local firms to access more trade credit financing. A better access to finance lowers the 
marginal value of cash, which means firms should keep less precautionary cash (Faulkender 
and Wang, 2006). Moreover, being less predatory and stricter in enforcing laws and rules, a 
good government may also help enhance corporate governance and transparency (Stulz, 2005; 
Desai et al., 2007), which in turn lowers the costs of debt and equity financing.3 This financial 
constraint mitigation argument predicts a negative relation between government quality and 
                                                             
3
 Note this possibility also points to a form of the interaction between the state agency problem and the insider 
agency problem that we will discuss next. 
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CCH.  
Third, a good government may also indirectly affect CCH through its interaction with the 
insider agency problem. A large wedge between the voting rights and cash flow rights owned by 
the ultimate owner generates more incentives for the controlling shareholder to expropriate 
outside minority investors. To the extent that cash, an anonymous and easy-to-transport liquid 
asset, is vulnerable to expropriation, a large ownership wedge is expected to lead the company 
to keep more cash to facilitate extraction (Kalchrva and Lins, 2007). A good government better 
protects investors via more effective law/contract enforcement, and this increases the cost to 
corporate insiders of extracting private benefits (e.g., via siphoning cash) from the firms they 
control. Indeed, state expropriation and insiders’ expropriation of private benefits often 
reinforce each other (Stulz, 2005), which suggests that reducing state expropriation also 
decreases the extent of insiders’ expropriation. We therefore hypothesize that government 
quality attenuates the positive relation between ownership wedge and CCH. 
We empirically test the above predictions with a unique dataset on government quality 
sourced from a World Bank (2006) Survey in China. Measuring government quality by indexes 
on property rights protection, cleanliness of a government, tax burden, and an aggregate of 
these indexes, we find robust evidence that firms hold less cash when there is a better local 
government. This evidence does not support the state expropriation argument, but is potentially 
consistent with the financial constraint mitigation argument and the notion of the interaction 
between the twin agency problems. Importantly, the result is not an artifact of differences in 
financial market development since we control for the difference in economic and credit market 
development in our cash holding models.  
We then seek to provide direct evidence on whether and how a good government mitigates 
the financial constraints of local firms. First, we show that government quality reduces the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow (Fazzari et al., 1988) and the sensitivity of cash to cash 
flow (Almeida et al., 2004). Second, we demonstrate that the negative effect of government 
quality on CCH is more pronounced in private firms than in SOEs because private firms face 
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more financial constraints than SOEs in China. Third, we explore the possible channels through 
which a good government helps relieve a local firm’s financial constraints and find that 
government quality improves firms’ access to bank loans and trade credit (measured by 
accounts payable).4 
As discussed above, the negative relation between government quality and cash holding is 
also potentially consistent with Stulz’s (2005) theory of the interaction between the twin agency 
problems. We use the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights for the ultimate owner 
to measure the extent of incentive conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. We 
consider this proxy appropriate in a setting such as China where the corporate ownership 
structure is concentrated (Lin et al., 2011). We find that a large wedge between the control 
rights and cash flow rights owned by the ultimate owner is associated with more CCH when 
government quality is below the sample median. The result also provides direct support for 
Stulz’s (2005) argument on the interaction between the twin agency problems by showing that 
such interaction affects CCH.  
Our study makes three contributions. First, in relation to CCH, prior studies have mainly 
focused on the state expropriation argument, but largely neglected the financial constraint 
mitigation argument.5 By showing that a good government helps the indigenous companies 
relieve financial constraints and enable them to keep less cash, our study sheds light on a new 
channel through which institutional quality affects CCH. Our finding differs from the positive 
relation between government quality and CCH reported in Caprio et al. (2013). Using an 
international sample, they only consider and find support for the state expropriation argument. 
The difference in results might be because their study is a joint test of the effect of shareholder 
rights and enforcement on CCH, whereas ours is a test of the law enforcement since we 
effectively hold the law-granted shareholder rights constant by using single-country data. It is 
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 Cull et al. (2014) also use bank loans and trade credit as main forms of corporate access to external finance in 
China. 
 
5
 To our knowledge, Kusnadi and Wei (2011) is the only study that recognizes this channel but their focus is on 
legal protection of minority shareholders rather than on government quality. 
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also possible that firms in China rely more heavily on debt financing (and this is typical of 
many developing countries). The different evidence obtained from China suggests that focusing 
on a single country outside the US may represent a fruitful exercise and provides a potential to 
refine the existing theories.  
Second, while Kalcheva and Lins (2007) are the first study to test the effect of the 
interaction between shareholder rights and insiders’ agency problem on CCH, our paper is the 
first to test the effect of the interaction between government quality (and law enforcement) and 
insiders’ agency problem on corporate cash polices. Different from the insignificant effect of 
shareholder rights on CCH observed in Kalcheva and Lins (2007), we find that government 
quality has a robust, negative and first-order effect on CCH regardless of the extent of 
ownership wedge. Third, we enrich the literature (e.g., see Cull and Xu, 2005; Fan et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2008; Lin, Lin and Zou, 2012; Firth et al., 2013; Zou and Adams, 2008; Ayyagari et 
al., 2010) on corporate finance in China, a large and growing economic power, by providing 
evidence on the cash holding decisions. Chinese firms are typically excluded from prior 
cross-country studies on cash holdings. As a result, we know little about this issue in China. 
Moreover, as noted by Cull et al. (2014), there has been very limited research on financial 
constraints in developing countries. Our study fills these voids. 
 
2. Institutional background 
China represents an appropriate laboratory for the examination of the effect of government 
quality on corporate cash policy for the following reasons. First, a major stream of the 
economic reforms in China over the last three decades has been to decentralize administrative 
rights and to increase local governments’ autonomy. Ayyagari et al. (2010) note that local 
governments in China can implement national laws according to their needs in order to compete 
against each other to promote regional economic development (Qian and Roland, 1998) or to 
enable corrupt government officials to extract rents. If a local government is committed to 
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developing the local economy, it is more likely to protect property rights, enforce laws and 
contracts, and refrain from expropriating firms (Levine, 2005). However, if a government (and 
its officials) is more interested in extracting private rents, it can expropriate firms via asking for 
bribery, imposing various local taxes and levies, and/or being lax in enforcing laws and 
contracts. This means that government quality could vary significantly between the Chinese 
cities.  
Second, while the country has uniform commercial laws that grant the same shareholder 
and creditor rights on paper, enforcement often deviates from law on paper and there is 
substantial disparity in property rights protection among different regions (Cull and Xu, 2005). 
More importantly, courts are not fully independent of the local government administration 
(Peerenboom, 2002). This means that government quality crucially determines the extent to 
which property rights are protected and laws and contracts are enforced. China therefore 
represents a natural laboratory within which to test the effect of government quality and law 
enforcement on corporate cash holdings. 
Third, corporate cash holding decisions are particularly important in China because there 
are various regulatory restrictions on the access to stock and bond financing (Xiao and Zou, 
2008). Indigenous firms heavily rely on formal or informal debt financing. Cash holding 
decisions are even more crucial for private firms as they are at a disadvantage in gaining access 
to formal debt financing provided by state-owned banks. The co-existence of SOEs and private 
firms enables us to investigate whether government quality has differential effects on firms with 
different owner identities and hence different financial constraints.  
Fourth, companies may use lines of credit and cash as substitutes to manage liquidity 
(Campello et al., 2011). Neglecting this interaction (as in most prior studies on cash holdings) 
may lead to biased inferences on cash holdings.6 In China, firms’ access to lines of credit is in 
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 The failure to control for lines of credit in many cash holding studies is presumably due to the difficulty in 
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general rare, and this feature allows us to conduct a cleaner test of the cash holding decision. 
Nevertheless, we control for the hand-collected lines of credit in our cash holding models. 
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Sample selection 
We obtain data on government quality from a World Bank (2006) survey report entitled 
“Governance, Investment Climate, and Harmonious Society — Competitiveness Enhancements 
for 120 Cities in China”. This survey covers 12,400 firms in 120 major cities in China and 
provides detailed city-level data on government effectiveness and progress toward a 
harmonious society, among other characteristics. The 120 cities are distributed across all 
provinces except Tibet and their combined GDP accounts for about 80% of China’s total GDP. 
The survey questions reflect how firms perceive the quality of the governments in 2004, and 
firm-level replies are then aggregated into various city-level average indexes. Cull et al. (2014) 
describe the dataset as large and representative and use it in examining the effect of government 
connections and firms’ financial constraints in China.7 Cull and Xu (2005), Ayyagari et al. 
(2010) and Lin et al. (2010) also use a similar but a smaller scale survey (covering 18 cities) 
conducted by the World Bank in early 2003 in their study of financing and investment of 
Chinese firms.  
As the World Bank Survey was undertaken in 2005 and collected data for 2004, we 
measure cash ratio, the dependent variable in our analysis for the period 2005 to 2007. Starting 
from 2005 allows the effect of government quality to show up in future corporate cash holding 
decisions. Ending in 2007 reflects a balance between the need to have more data for analysis 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
obtaining data on lines of credit.  
 
7
 The city-level indexes may arguably represent finer measures of government quality and institutional 
developments than other levels (e.g., province level) used in other studies (e.g., Kusnadi and Yang, 2010). 
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and the need to ensure that information on government quality does not become stale. It also 
has the advantage of avoiding the possible structural break effect of the recent financial crisis 
on corporate cash holdings.  
We exclude from the sample financial firms and firms that are not headquartered in any of 
the 120 cities covered by the World Bank Survey, and the cities that do not have any listed 
companies. Following the literature (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Cull and Xu, 2005; 
Ayyagari et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2010; Becker et al., 2011), we focus on the location of 
corporate headquarters. This focus is also important in our study for two reasons. First, regional 
protection is common and strong in China, and a local government invariably discriminates 
against firms headquartered in other places in allocating scarce resources partly because firms 
that are headquartered locally need to pay their income tax to the local government treasury (Li 
et al., 2004). Second, the jurisdiction requirement in China is that the plaintiff (e.g., a bank or a 
business supplier) can only bring a lawsuit to the court where the defendant is incorporated. 
This means that the quality of the government where a firm is headquartered matters.8  
Our final sample consists of a maximum number of 3,074 firm-years across 114 cities 
from 2005 to 2007, and the exact number of observations may vary according to model 
specifications due to the missing values on some variables. Accounting and ownership variables 
are extracted from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database that is 
available from WRDS. 
 
3.2. Government quality measures 
                                                             
8
 In China it is rare but possible that some large firms’ major assets and financing are located outside the place of 
the firm’s headquarter. If so, imprecise mapping may arise. (There is no public data on firms’ geographical 
distribution of assets and financing in China). While this potential imprecise mapping is common in the literature, 
we note that this possibility should add more noises and work against finding a negative relation between local 
government quality and the level of corporate cash holdings. Moreover, in unreported tests, we drop firms whose 
size is in the top median group assuming that large firms are more likely to be geographically diversified and find 
that our inference is robust.  
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Levine (2005) argues that a good government can protect property rights by a) facilitating 
private contracting, and applying laws and rules fairly to everyone; and b) sufficiently 
constraining itself from expropriation. To measure a), we use a city-level index on property 
rights protection (Property rights protection) by the local government and local court obtained 
from the World Bank Survey (2006). The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value 
indicating better property rights protection by law/contract enforcement. Government 
expropriation in contemporary China can take the forms of tax & levies imposed and corruption. 
We use two city-level indexes obtained from the World Bank Survey (2006) to measure the 
extent of government expropriation. The first index (Lightness of tax burden) is based on the 
taxes and fees that a firm pays as a percentage of its sales. This measure includes not only the 
taxes but also the various fees collected by the government. To be specific, the measure consists 
of value added tax, income tax, business, resource, land, and real estate taxes, plus 
miscellaneous administrative levies and charges. All the taxes and fees except for value added 
tax and part of income tax are directly collected by local governments. Tax and fee collection is 
considered an important means of government expropriation (Cull and Xu, 2005; Stulz, 2005). 
Firth et al. (2013) show that in China local governments that spend more on public 
administration tend to collect more fees from companies and spend less on social welfare and 
infrastructures. Therefore, a low-quality government can use this tool to extract firms’ resources 
while a good government can use it to foster a more conducive business environment for local 
firms.  
The second measure (Government cleanliness) is based on firms’ average expenditure on 
travel and entertainment (scaled by firms’ total sales) in a city.9 Managers of China’s listed 
firms often use such expenditure as “informal payment” to bribe government officials. Caiet al. 
(2011) use the same variable as a measure of corruption in Chinese firms and find that such 
expenditure includes both “grease money” that helps firms obtain better government service, 
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 As the World Bank Survey puts, it is pointless to directly ask on corruption (also see Xu, 2011). 
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and “protection money” that helps firms reduce government expropriation by taxation. To ease 
the interpretation of results, we multiply the last two measures by -1 in regressions so that for 
all measures, a higher value indicates higher government quality.   
These measures of government quality are also used in some prior studies. For example, 
Cull and Xu (2005) and Lin et al. (2010) use a similar property rights protection index in their 
study of the influence of property rights security on firm reinvestment and R&D investment in 
China. Fan et al. (2009) use property rights protection and corruption as measures of 
government quality in studying FDI inflow. Johnson et al. (2000) use taxation, corruption and 
confidence in court as measures to investigate why firms conduct unofficial activities. Given 
that these measures of government quality and the data from the World Bank Survey have been 
used in prior studies, we believe our government quality measures are reasonable and 
meaningful. 
Since these three proxies measure different aspects of a good government, we also 
construct an aggregate government quality index following Francis et al. (2004). Specifically, 
we first rank each government quality proxy into decile groups. We then calculate the mean 
ranking of the three proxies to form an aggregate government quality index. A higher value in 
the aggregate index indicates higher government quality.10 
 
3.3. Dependent and control variables 
Following Dittmar et al. (2003) and Harford et al. (2008), we use the logarithm of firms’ 
cash ratio that is defined as the amount of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets net of 
cash and cash equivalents as our dependent variable. In addition to government quality proxies, 
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 As a robustness check, we also use a principal component analysis to aggregate the three proxies and find 
consistent results. See the discussion in Section 4.2. 
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we follow the literature on firms’ cash holdings (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Capiro et al., 2013) to include in our models a large number of control 
variables that have been shown to affect cash holdings. Specifically, we include in the cash 
model the natural logarithm of total assets, net working capital (net of cash and equivalents)/net 
assets (NWC), firm leverage, Q, cash flow from operating activities (earnings before 
extraordinary items and depreciation minus cash dividends) divided by total assets, cash flow 
volatility, capital expenditure divided by total assets, and a dummy variable on dividend payout.  
The main firm-level insider agency problem proxy we use is the ownership wedge that is 
defined as the ultimate owner’s control rights minus its cash flow rights. Using the ownership 
wedge to proxy for the insider expropriation problem is a common practice when ownership 
structure is concentrated (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2011). The larger the ownership 
wedge, the higher the incentives for the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority 
shareholders. We expect firms with a large ownership wedge to keep more cash to facilitate rent 
extraction.  
We also include firm identity (state-owned or not) in our models to control for the 
possibility that SOEs and private firms may have different patterns in cash holding decisions.11 
Such differences may arise from their differential access to external finance and different 
agency problems. Private firms have less access to external finance than SOEs and so may need 
to hoard more cash to prepare for future adversity. In addition, private firms tend to have more 
effective monitoring over the management (Zou et al., 2008). If self-interested managers value 
the flexibility and discretion afforded by cash, private firms are expected to keep less cash 
because shareholder monitoring is more effective. On the other hand, if self-interested 
managers value more the private benefit from spending cash, more effective monitoring of 
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 The ownership identity data are obtained from the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) database 
compiled by Peking University. 
 
15 
 
managers in private firms may result in more cash.12 Therefore, the effect of firm identity on 
cash holdings is not clear cut ex ante. 
Chinese firms, especially SOEs, may sometimes receive direct subsidies from local 
governments, which could decrease CCH. We thus include government subsidies received by a 
firm in a year divided by total assets as an additional control variable. 
One side of our argument on the effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings 
focuses on how a good government helps relieve firms’ financial constraints and thereby enable 
them to hold less cash. If a good government helps develop a more sophisticated local banking 
sector, local firms should have better access to finance and so hold less cash. While this 
possibility is not inconsistent with our hypothesis, we follow Dittmar et al (2003) and Kalcheva 
and Lins (2007) to control for financial market development (proxied by the ratio of bank loans 
to GDP) and economic development (GDP per capita) in our models to show that the effect of a 
good government on corporate cash holding goes beyond such a possibility. That is, we 
conjecture that the main channels through which a good government helps mitigate financial 
constraints are: a good government enhances the credibility of local firms and lowers the credit 
risk of banks and a firm’s trading partners so that local firms can access more bank loans and 
trade credits.  
Although only 20% of Chinese firms have access to lines of credit that is an alternative 
liquidity source, we include in our model a variable on a firm’s available lines of credit scaled 
by the year-beginning total assets, to ensure that our inference on CCH is not biased by lines of 
credit as an omitted correlated variable. Information on lines of credit is hand collected from 
corporate filings and announcements. 
Appendix 1 provides detailed definitions of all variables. Except for net working 
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 See Harford et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion of these different arguments. 
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capital/net assets, all other control variables are calculated at the beginning of the year to ease 
the interpretation of results. Non-logged continuous variables are winsorized at 1% at both tails 
to mitigate the undue effect of extreme values. All of our models also include industry fixed 
effects as well as year dummies to control for the effect of time related industry patterns and 
macroeconomic uncertainties (Dittmar, 2008). 
 
3.4. Summary statistics 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The cash ratio has a mean of 0.199 and a 
median of 0.138, and both are higher than the figures reported in the cross-country samples 
used in Dittmar et al. (2003) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007). This is consistent with our 
argument that cash holding decisions are important for Chinese companies that often face 
financial constraints. In addition, our sample firms have a mean total debt ratio of 54.2%, a 
mean Q of 1.179, and a mean chance of paying a cash dividend of about 50%.  
    The government quality measures show reasonable variance across different cities. 
Unreported correlation coefficients suggest that the cash ratio is negatively related to the 
proxies of government quality, which provides preliminary support for our financial constraint 
mitigation hypothesis and/or the interaction between the twin agency problems rather than the 
government expropriation argument. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4.  Empirical results 
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4.1. Government quality and cash holdings 
We first report the firm-level results from regressing the logged cash ratio on government 
quality measures in Table 2. As our key independent variables on government quality are 
measured at the city level, firm-level regression errors are correlated within cities (see Moulton, 
1986). We therefore report robust standard errors clustered at the city level to account for the 
within-city correlation among firms.13  
We include one government quality proxy at a time. The results show that all the 
government quality proxies and their aggregate are loaded negatively and significantly. 
Therefore, firms hold less cash when government quality is higher. This finding does not 
support the state expropriation argument that predicts a positive relation between government 
quality and corporate cash holdings (see Caprio et al., 2013).14 Instead, the result is consistent 
with the argument that a good government helps relieve local firms’ financial constraints and 
thereby enable them to hold less cash and/or that a good government constrains the insider 
agency problem. This leads us to conduct further tests later on to ascertain the exact channels 
that underpin this negative relation. The effect of government quality on cash holdings also 
appears economically significant, for example, when the property rights protection index 
increases by one standard deviation, a firm’s cash holding lowers by about 2 percentage points, 
which is about 10% of the sample mean of the cash ratio. In unreported tests, we find that the 
negative relation between government quality and cash holding is not due to the possibility that 
investors force firms to disgorge more cash as payouts in places where government quality is 
high (e.g., see Dittmar et al., 2003). 
                                                             
13
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this. 
 
14
 One may argue that facing the risk of government expropriation, firms may need to hold a minimum amount of 
cash to pay government expropriation. This reasoning suggest that under the state expropriation argument, firms’ 
cash holdings may have a fixed component but overall cash holding should increase with government quality, or it 
is possible that the effect of government quality on cash holdings could first decrease and then increase with 
government quality. Based on our data, we find no evidence consistent with these possibilities. We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for bringing this argument to our attention. 
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Regarding the control variables, consistent with Dittmar et al. (2003), we find that firms 
with more growth opportunities (as measured by a higher Q value) and/or more operational 
cash flow tend to hold more cash. As in Kalcheva and Lins (2007) and Capiro et al. (2013), 
firms with more working capital, higher leverage, and larger capital expenditure tend to hold 
less cash. Similar to the finding of Opler et al. (1999) and consistent with the argument of 
Dittmar (2008), firms with more volatile cash flows choose to hold more cash. Also we find that 
firms paying dividends in the previous year hold more cash in the current period. While this is 
different from the finding in Opler et al. (1999), it is possible that Chinese firms want to keep 
sufficient cash to maintain a “sticky” dividend payout.  
In addition, we find that private firms have more cash holdings than SOEs. This is 
consistent with the notion that private firms have limited access to finance and need to hoard 
more cash to prepare for future adversity than SOEs. Alternatively, it may reflect that the 
possibility that the more effective monitoring of managers in private firms reduces managers’ 
waste of cash in overinvestments. Other control variables do not have a significant effect on 
cash holdings. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.2. Robustness of results 
4.2.1. City-level regression 
Since each city has a different number of firms in our sample, a concern is whether the 
above results are driven by a few cities with a large number of firms. To mitigate this concern, 
we follow Caprio et al. (2013) to run a city-level regression in which firm-level controls are 
averaged across all sample firms in a city in a year. The results, presented in Table 3, are 
generally similar to those obtained from the firm-level analysis reported in Table 2: government 
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quality is negatively related to cash holdings though the significance of lightness of tax burden 
is on the margin. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2.2. Alternative government quality measures at the city-industry level  
 Since our government quality measures are constructed from firms’ perceptions averaged 
within the city level, there might be some unobserved industry characteristics that are correlated 
with both firms’ perceptions and cash holdings. In the baseline regression, we have used 
city-level government quality measures and controlled for industry fixed effects. As an 
alternative way, we explicitly allow firms’ perceptions of government quality to vary with 
industries by measuring government quality as city-industry means of firm perceptions.15 
Correspondingly, we cluster standard errors at both city and industry level to account for the 
correlation within an industry-city pair.  It is worth noting that the World Bank Survey (2006) 
only covers manufacturing firms and so the sample size drops by about one-third in models 
using city-industry-level government quality proxies.16 The results are reported in Table 4. 
As shown in Table 4, the results on government proxies are robust to the use of 
industry-city-level government quality proxies. In addition, the results on almost all firm-level 
control variables remain similar even with these smaller samples. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
                                                             
15
 Long (2010) also uses city-industry mean of firm perceptions as a measure in the study of court effectiveness. 
 
16
 In addition, the proxy on property rights protection has an even smaller sample size because of missing values 
due to some firms’ non-responses in some small industries. 
20 
 
4.2.3. Other robustness checks 
In addition, we conduct several other robustness checks as follows. Since cash ratio (the 
dependent variable) is measured over the period 2005-2007 while government quality (the key 
explanatory variable) is taken from the World Bank Survey that reflects the situation in 2004, 
one may wonder how sensitive our results are to the choice of the measurement years. In 
unreported results, we run a regression using the cash ratio and other independent variables for 
year 2005 only and another regression using the cash ratio and other independent variables 
averaged over the period 2005-2007. Our key finding is not altered qualitatively by either of the 
alternatives.  
Our current aggregate government quality measure is the mean decile ranking of each 
government quality measure. As a robustness check, we construct the aggregate measure of 
government quality by a principal component analysis and regress cash holdings on this 
aggregate measure. The untabulated results show that this variable also has a significant and 
negative relation with cash holdings.  
Given a certain level of liquidity demand, a firm may choose between holding cash and 
lines of credit (Campello et al., 2011). Compared with cash, funds available in the form of lines 
of credit are subject to bank monitoring and they are also harder to be expropriated by the 
government. Therefore, in unreported results we also regress cash/(cash + lines of credit) on the 
aggregate government quality measure and ownership wedge of the ultimate owner. We, 
however, did not find any significant result on the government quality measure and ownership 
wedge. This, however, may not be surprising given that less than 20% of our sample firms have 
access to lines of credit so that the dependent variable is very close to one for most firms. This 
lack of variation in the dependent variable means that our test has very limited power.  
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4.3. Evidence on good governments relieving financial constraints   
In this section, we seek to provide direct evidence on whether a good government mitigates 
the financial constraints of local firms.  
4.3.1. The effect of government quality on the investment sensitivity to cash flow and cash 
sensitivity to cash flow 
We employ the investment-cash sensitivity model from Fazzari et al. (1988):17  
Investment = f(CF,
 
Government quality,
 
CF*Government quality,
 
lagged Q, Controls)  (1) 
where Investment is defined as capital expenditure/year-beginning total assets, CF is cash 
flow (i.e., earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation minus dividends/year-beginning 
total assets), and Q for investment opportunity.  
Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that since external financing is more costly than internal 
financing, firms rely more on internal financing when they face serious financial constraints. As 
a result, most capital expenditure should be financed by internally generated cash flow. 
Therefore, the coefficient of CF is expected to be significantly positive and its value can be 
regarded as a measure of the degree of financial constraint.  
We introduce a government quality measure into the model and interact it with cash flow. 
If a good government does help relieve financial constraints, the coefficient for 
CF*Government quality is expected to be significantly negative. The results reported in Table 5 
confirm our financial constraint mitigation hypothesis. In all the four government quality 
proxies, the coefficient of the interaction term is negatively significant, indicating that a good 
government does help reduce financial constraints, and thus reduce cash holdings in local 
                                                             
17
 This model is also used in McLean et al. (2011) on the investment sensitivity to cash flow and Q. 
 
22 
 
firms.18   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
We also conduct city-level analyses on the role of government quality in reducing financial 
constraints. Following McLean et al. (2011), we first regress capital expenditure/year-beginning 
total assets on cash flow from operations/year-beginning total assets (CF) and lagged Q using 
all sample firms within a city to obtain the coefficient of CF (i.e., the sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow in a city).19 We then regress Ln(1+ coefficient of CF) on government quality 
measures controlling for GDP per capita and firm characteristics averaged across the sample 
firms within a city. The regression coefficients of government quality measures can then be 
interpreted to be the marginal impacts of government quality on the financial constraints 
measured as the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.  
The results from the second stage regressions (unreported for brevity) show that all local 
government quality measures are significantly and negatively related to the financial constraint 
measure (the dependent variable), suggesting that a good government does help reduce firms’ 
financial constraints. 
However, whether investment-cash flow sensitivity is a good indicator of financial 
constraint is not without controversy in the literature (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000).20 
We thus use an alternative measure of financial constraints, i.e., cash flow sensitivity of cash 
                                                             
18
 Note that the coefficient of CF is only significantly positive in two models. In another specification, we follow 
Jaccard et al. (1990) to de-mean both CF and government quality measures and to use them in regression and in 
constructing the interaction term. The results on the interactions are robust and the coefficient of CF is positive and 
significant in all models.  
 
19
 When we estimate CF coefficients for each city, we require each city to have at least ten usable firm-years and 
only 88 cities meet this requirement. 
 
20
 Two recent studies (Moshirian and Vadilyev, 2013; Cull et al., 2014) confirm that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is a valid measure of financial constraints, particularly in developing countries. 
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posited in Almeida et al. (2004). The intuition of this measure is that if firms are more 
financially constrained, they tend to save more cash flow as cash to prepare for future adversity. 
To be specific, we employ the following model: 
  ΔCash ratio = f(Cash flow, Government quality, Cash flow*Government quality, 
Controls)                                   (2) 
Following Almeida et al. (2004), the controls in Equation 2 include firm size, Q, 
investment, change in non-cash net working capital (ΔNWC), and change in short-term debt. 
Appendix 1 provides detailed definitions of these variables. We expect the coefficient for the 
interaction term between cash flow and government quality to be significantly negative. This is 
indeed what we find in Table 6. The results on the control variables are consistent with those in 
Almedia et al. (2004). Therefore, we find some direct evidence that government quality helps 
local firms relieve their financial constraints (measured by both investment sensitivity to cash 
flow and cash sensitivity to cash flow).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.3.2. Differential impacts of government quality on cash holdings of firms with different 
financial constraints 
As discussed earlier, compared with SOEs, private firms are often disadvantaged in 
transition economies including China. For example, they have less access to external formal 
finance (Firth et al., 2008; Ayyagari et al., 2010), are subject to more unfavorable government 
regulations, or pay more “extralegal” fees (Johnson et al., 2000; McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). 
Private firms therefore face more financial constraints. In contrast, SOEs in China may have 
soft-budget constraints, i.e., when an SOE faces financial hardship, the government may come 
to rescue it especially when the SOE is large (Qian and Roland, 1998). As a result, SOEs do not 
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need to hoard much cash. If the financial constraint mitigation argument is at work, the negative 
relation between government quality and cash holding should be more pronounced in private 
firms. This possibility is examined in Table 7. We first create an interaction term between the 
Private dummy (which equals one if the ultimate owner is not a state-owned entity and zero 
otherwise) and aggregate government quality. We expect the coefficient of the interaction term 
to be negatively significant. The results reported in Table 7 provide some support for the 
argument that the financial constraint mitigation effect of a good government is more beneficial 
to private firms than to SOEs.  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The results from our above three tests provide direct support for the financial constraint 
mitigation hypothesis that is predicated on the argument that better property rights protection 
and contract enforcement by a good government improves firms’ access to finance. Importantly, 
these results are not an artifact of differences in financial market development since we control 
for the difference in economic and credit market development in our cash holding models.21  
 
4.4. The channels through which a good government relieves financial constraints   
Thus far, we have found that higher government quality leads to less corporate cash 
holdings and the result is due to good governments helping relieve the financial constraints that 
local firms face. A natural follow-up question is through what channels a good government 
achieves this.  
We consider two possibilities. First, as we have discussed in the introduction part and 
                                                             
21
 Private credit/GDP does not always enter the model significantly. Kusnadi and Wei (2011) also find that once 
legal protection of investors is controlled for, financial market development has no incremental impact on firms’ 
cash management policies. 
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hypotheses, Chinese firms rely heavily on bank debt financing. Since a good government 
protects property rights by enforcing law/business contracts, the chance for banks to secure loan 
repayments and to repossess collateral in the event of a default will be higher. Banks are 
therefore more willing to lend to companies in cities where government quality is higher and 
this increases firms’ access to bank loans. Second, a good government provides better legal and 
administrative systems, which improves the trust among business entities and enhances contract 
enforcement. As a result, it is possible for firms to use more trade credit such as accounts 
payable as a source of short-term finance (Wu et al., 2014). Cull et al. (2014) also use bank 
loans and trade credit as proxies for access to external finance in China. 
We test these arguments by regressing firms’ access to bank loans (proxied by the sum of 
short-term and long-term loans that the company borrows from banks scaled by total assets) and 
firms’ accounts payable divided by total net assets on government quality. To save space, we 
focus on the aggregate government quality measure and the result shown in column 1 of Table 8 
suggests that government quality is positively related to firms’ access to bank loans. The 
negative coefficient of Q is consistent with the argument that high-growth firms may need to 
use more equity to finance their growth in order to lower the agency cost of debt that arises 
from the more information asymmetry and/or high risk in a high-Q firm. To examine whether 
government quality helps high-Q firms to obtain bank loans, we interact Q and government 
quality in column 2. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at the 
0.10 level, thereby providing some weak support for the argument that better property rights 
protection via law/contract enforcement afforded by a good government helps mitigate banks’ 
concern over the credit risk of lending to more opaque high-Q firms and facilitates their access 
to bank loans. In column 3, we also find that a good government facilitates trade credit 
financing as measured by accounts payable. 
Taking the above results together, we conclude that a good government relieves firms’ 
financial constraints, which reduces corporate cash holdings. We note that this only speaks of 
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the dominating effect of a good government perceived by corporate insiders and we cannot rule 
out the possibility of government expropriation that might coexist and exert an opposite 
influence on firms’ cash holding decisions. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
4.5. The interaction between the state agency problem and insider agency problem 
As discussed earlier, a negative relation between government quality and cash holding is 
also potentially consistent with the argument concerning the interaction between the twin 
agency problems as advanced by Stulz (2005). Specifically, we hypothesize in the introduction 
part that a large ownership wedge is expected to lead the company to keep more cash to 
facilitate extraction (Kalcheva and Lins, 2007), and a good government mitigates the insider 
agency problem since it increases the cost for insiders to appropriate cash from the firm. We 
examine these possibilities in this section. The results are reported in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In column 1, we define a dummy for high aggregate government quality (AGQ) that 
equals one if AGQ is above the sample median, and interact it with ownership wedge. The high 
AGQ dummy has a negative coefficient and the interaction term is also loaded negatively. This 
suggests that the effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings is strictly negative, 
reaffirming the financial constraint mitigation argument. The negative and significant 
coefficient of the interaction term indicates that a good government attenuates the positive 
relation between ownership wedge and cash holdings because it increases the cost to corporate 
insiders of extracting private benefits (e.g., cash) from the firms they control. It is also 
27 
 
consistent with Stulz’s (2005) argument that state expropriation and insiders’ expropriation of 
private benefits often reinforce each other.  
The standalone coefficient of ownership wedge is positive and significant. Therefore, in 
cities with a lower-than-sample-median government quality index, a large ownership wedge is 
associated with more corporate cash holdings. In contrast, in cities with a 
higher-than-sample-median government quality index, ownership wedge has a coefficient of 
-0.411 (= 0.631 – 1.042), and a Wald test suggests that it is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the insider agency problem is more pronounced when government quality is low. 
Overall, we conclude that the quality of external institutions such as the government appears to 
have a first-order effect on corporate cash holdings. In column 2, we further control for 
city-level financial and economic development, and the results are weaker but qualitatively 
similar. 
 
4.6. Discussions 
Compared with studies that regress a firm-level variable on other firm-level variables, 
endogeneity in our study should be less of a concern given that our dependent variable is at the 
firm level and government quality is at the city level. However, since our government quality 
measures are constructed from firms’ perceptions averaged at the city level, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that these government quality measures are subject to a feedback effect running 
from firms’ financial situation (e.g., cash holdings). Xu (2011, p.313) in reviewing research using 
data on World Bank investment climate surveys notes the special difficulty in identifying 
appropriate instruments given the cross-sectional nature of the World Bank data. As a result, he 
concludes “… most research using the investment climate data cannot establish causality 
convincingly. …The results should therefore be interpreted as a collection of correlations. To the 
extent that the results are robust across similar contexts, or consistent with plausible theories, the 
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conclusions are more credible.” Our results are subject to the same limitation. However, it has 
been well established in the literature that private firms are more financially constrained than 
SOEs in China due largely to SOEs’ privileged access to loan credits provided by state-owned 
banks. In this connection, our conclusion that high government quality mitigates financial 
constraints and enables firms to hold less cash is more credible. This is because we rely on 
institutions to identify (private) firms facing financial constraints (as in Cull et al., 2014; Hoshi et 
al., 1991) and find that private firms hold more cash than do SOEs, and the negative effect of 
government quality on corporate cash holdings is more pronounced in private firms. We are also 
able to provide an analysis on the channels through which government quality mitigates financial 
constraints and the related evidence concerning firms’ access to bank loans and trade credits 
makes our story more compelling. Nevertheless, we advise readers to interpret our results with 
some cautions.    
 
5.  Conclusion 
We investigate the role of government quality in firms’ cash holding decisions. Our study 
also aims to provide a cleaner test of the effect of law enforcement on cash holdings by 
effectively holding shareholder rights conferred by law on paper constant. We achieve these 
aims by using China as a natural laboratory that has uniform laws, and large disparity in law 
enforcement, economic and institutional developments among different regions, and a corporate 
sector with heavy reliance on debt financing (and this financing feature is typical of many 
emerging markets). 
We hypothesize that on the one hand, a good government refrains from expropriating firms 
and enables firms to hold more cash. On the other hand, a good government may help relieve 
financial constraints and enable firms to hold less cash – a new channel that has been largely 
neglected by extant studies. A good government may also indirectly affect corporate cash 
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holdings through its effect on insider agency problems.  
Using a unique dataset from the World Bank covering 120 Chinese cities on local 
government quality, we find that local government quality has a negative effect on corporate 
cash holdings, which does not support the state expropriation argument. In support of the 
financial constraint mitigation argument, we find a good government lowers the investment 
sensitivity to cash flows and the sensitivity of cash to cash flows, decreases cash holdings more 
significantly in private firms than in SOEs, and improves access to bank loans and trade credit 
financing. Since firms’ access to finance has a crucial effect on economic growth, we think this 
result has important policy implications for economic growth and development. We also report 
evidence that the negative relation between government quality and cash holdings reflects the 
interaction between the twin agency problems (Stulz, 2005).  
Our study represents a refined test of the effect of the enforcement-component of  investor 
protection and firm-level governance on corporate cash holdings, thereby adding to the cash 
holding literature that contains mixed evidence regarding the effect of investor protection on 
cash holdings. It also contributes to the limited research on how government quality shapes firm 
financial policies, and firms’ financial constraints in emerging markets.  
Our above evidence addresses the question of how government quality affects firms’ cash 
holdings. A related question is how government quality affects the marginal value of cash. On 
the one hand, firms in regions with a good government should have a lower marginal value of 
cash holdings if they face less financial constraints and have easier access to finance 
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006). On the other hand, firms in regions with a good government can 
have a higher marginal value of cash since better law and contract enforcement constrains the 
insider agency problem (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) and the risk of state expropriation is 
lower (Caprio et al., 2013). Therefore, ex ante the predicted effect of government quality on the 
marginal value of cash is unclear. More importantly, our sample (2005-2007) period is  
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unsuitable for conducting a reliable analysis on the marginal value due to the frequent and 
lengthy stock trading suspensions and the very volatile price movements during the split 
share-structure reform that coincided with our sample period. The reform started in 2005 affects 
all listed firms and aims to make large blocks of non-publicly traded shares publicly tradable 
upon negotiations among shareholders. As such, we do not examine the effect of government 
quality on the marginal value of cash in the current study. Future studies could benefit from 
testing how government quality affects the marginal value of cash in China when more data are 
available. They should also test the financial constraint mitigation argument using data from 
other individual countries. 
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Appendix 1   
Variable Definition. 
Variables Definition 
Proxies for government quality 
Property rights protection  The city-level index (ranges between 0 and 1) measures the likelihood that the 
responding firms’ property and contract rights would be protected and enforced in 
business disputes in 2004 (Source: the World Bank Survey 2006)  
Lightness of tax burden Firms’ taxation and miscellaneous administrative fees/sales*100, averaged in a city and 
in 2004, and the measure is multiplied by -1 in regressions (Source: the World Bank 
Survey 2006) 
Government cleanliness Firms’ travel and entertainment costs/sales*1000, averaged in a city and in 2004, and the 
measure is multiplied by -1 in regressions (Source: the World Bank Survey 2006) (we 
multiple the ratio by 1000 to make the magnitude of the variable’s regression 
coefficients more presentable) 
Aggregate government quality Mean decile ranking of the above three government quality measures  
Firm-level financial characteristics 
Cash ratio The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets, where net assets = total assets - cash 
and cash equivalents 
Cash flow Earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation minus cash dividends, scaled by 
total assets 
Q Proxied by market to book ratio of the firm 
Firm size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets 
Cash flow risk Standard deviation of cash flow (defined above) over the past 12 quarters 
Short-term debt (total liabilities - long-term liabilities)/total assets  
Bank loan  The sum of all short-term and long-term loans that the company borrows from banks, 
scaled by total assets 
Accounts payable The ratio of accounts payable to net assets 
NWC (Net working capital - cash and cash equivalents)/net assets 
Capex Capital expenditure/total assets 
Dividend payout (0/1) A dummy that equals one if a firm paid a cash dividend in a year and zero otherwise 
Subsidy Subsidies provided by the local government to the firm scaled by total assets in a year 
Lines of credit  Available lines of credit divided by the beginning total assets  
Firm-level governance characteristics 
Private (0/1) Equals one if the ultimate controlling shareholder is not a state-owned entity and zero 
otherwise. 
Ownership wedge Proportion of control rights of the ultimate owner – proportion of cash flow rights of the 
ultimate owner 
City-level characteristics 
Private credit/GDP Bank loans/GDP in the province in which the firm is located 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita  
GDP growth  A city’s GDPt/GDPt-1-1  
 (Note: All non-logged continuous variables are winsorized at 1% at both tails). 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables defined in Appendix 1 and used in subsequent 
analyses. City-level government quality proxies are for the 114 cities that meet our sample selection 
criteria (see Section 2.1). These proxies are taken from the World Bank Survey (2006). Except for firms’ 
ultimate owner identity that is from the CCER database, firm characteristics are for the pooled firm-years 
for the 114 cities and are extracted from the CSMAR database. 
 
Variable N Mean sd Min P50 Max 
City-level government quality 
proxies 
      
Property rights protection 114 0.634 0.165 0.269 0.661 0.982 
Lightness of tax burden 114 4.945 1.390 1.100 5.000 8.700 
Government cleanliness 114 0.124 0.050 0.030 0.120 0.270 
Aggregate government quality 114 3.060 1.828 0.100 2.600 6.133 
       
Firm characteristics       
Cash ratio 3073 0.199 0.211 0.001 0.138 1.453 
NWC 3073 -0.118 0.330 -1.917 -0.087 0.502 
Firm size 3074 21.250 1.064 18.005 21.160 25.528 
Leverage 3074 0.542 0.315 0.064 0.524 2.669 
Q 3074 1.179 0.466 0.773 1.069 7.287 
Capex 3061 0.065 0.074 0.001 0.043 0.413 
Cash flow risk 3074 0.050 0.025 0.010 0.046 0.127 
Cash flow 3072 0.032 0.114 -0.730 0.046 0.224 
Dividend payout (0/1) 3074 0.503 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Short-term debt 3073 0.494 0.329 0.060 0.458 2.546 
Ownership wedge 3001 0.092 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.522 
Bank loan 3073 0.243 0.183 0.000 0.228 1.106 
Accounts payable 3073 0.111 0.094 0.001 0.085 0.474 
Subsidy 3074 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.036 
Private (0/1) 3074 0.328 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Lines of credit 3074 0.045 0.164 0.000 0.000 2.482 
       
Other control variables       
Private credit/GDP 3074 1.443 0.381 0.642 1.408 2.400 
GDP per capita 3074 9.731 0.656 8.189 9.737 10.921 
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Table 2 Corporate cash holdings and government quality: Firm-level regressions  
The table reports results from regressing logged cash ratio on government quality at the firm level. The other 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the city level) are used in computing 
p-value (in parentheses). *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level 
(two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year and industry dummies are omitted for brevity.  
Y=Ln(cash ratio) 1 2 3 4 
Property rights protection -0.114***    
 (0.000)    
Lightness of tax burden  -0.722***   
  (0.000)   
Government cleanliness   -0.142**  
   (0.020)  
Aggregate government quality    -0.085*** 
    (0.000) 
NWC -0.579*** -0.584*** -0.589*** -0.582*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.014 
 (0.723) (0.677) (0.655) (0.701) 
Leverage -1.271*** -1.313*** -1.309*** -1.282*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.208*** 0.223*** 0.218*** 0.219*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Capex -0.759*** -0.743** -0.743** -0.734** 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) 
Cash flow risk 6.060*** 6.123*** 6.119*** 6.120*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow 1.277*** 1.222*** 1.246*** 1.273*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend payout (0/1) 0.345*** 0.325*** 0.330*** 0.337*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidy 1.337 2.122 1.556 1.644 
 (0.772) (0.647) (0.739) (0.722) 
Ownership wedge 0.120 0.290 0.297 0.215 
 (0.621) (0.246) (0.232) (0.379) 
Private (0/1) 0.150** 0.115* 0.115* 0.130** 
 (0.017) (0.070) (0.071) (0.039) 
Lines of credit 0.078 0.113 0.076 0.104 
 (0.398) (0.220) (0.402) (0.258) 
Private credit/GDP 0.079 0.004 0.064 0.021 
 (0.436) (0.980) (0.686) (0.884) 
GDP per capita 0.045 0.166*** 0.128* 0.109 
 (0.502) (0.008) (0.072) (0.146) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,001 3,001 3,001 3,001 
Adj.R2 0.274 0.257 0.253 0.268 
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Table 3 Corporate cash holdings and government quality: City-level regressions 
The table reports results from regressing logged cash ratio on government quality at the city level. The Variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. Firm-level controls are averaged across all sample firms in a city in a year. Robust 
standard errors (clustered at the city level) are used in computing p-value (in parentheses). *, **, ***: statistically 
significantly at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year and 
industry dummies are omitted for brevity.  
Y=Ln(cash ratio) 1 2 3 4 
Property rights protection -0.169***    
 (0.000)    
Lightness of tax burden  -0.877   
  (0.125)   
Government cleanliness   -0.297**  
   (0.015)  
Aggregate government quality    -0.130*** 
    (0.002) 
NWC 0.287 0.352 0.308 0.310 
 (0.521) (0.450) (0.504) (0.494) 
Firm size 0.018 0.010 0.035 -0.004 
 (0.903) (0.950) (0.802) (0.980) 
Leverage 
-0.236 -0.351 -0.207 -0.275 
 (0.617) (0.478) (0.670) (0.564) 
Q 0.207 0.211 0.223 0.220 
 (0.344) (0.335) (0.318) (0.307) 
Capex 
-1.601 -1.776 -1.606 -1.517 
 (0.146) (0.131) (0.158) (0.191) 
Cash flow risk 11.212** 12.875** 12.183** 11.551** 
 (0.036) (0.016) (0.022) (0.033) 
Cash flow 1.560* 1.425* 1.606* 1.503* 
 (0.054) (0.089) (0.062) (0.072) 
Dividend payout (0/1) 0.381* 0.329 0.410* 0.364 
 (0.082) (0.145) (0.066) (0.103) 
Subsidy 52.017** 58.609** 57.552** 56.034** 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Ownership wedge 
-0.551 0.012 0.169 -0.515 
 (0.618) (0.992) (0.888) (0.648) 
Private (0/1) 0.133 0.019 0.008 0.092 
 (0.640) (0.947) (0.978) (0.745) 
Lines of credit 0.969 0.965 0.788 0.940 
 (0.314) (0.376) (0.439) (0.345) 
Private credit/GDP 
-0.047 -0.425** -0.347* -0.255 
 (0.802) (0.037) (0.095) (0.195) 
GDP per capita 0.060 0.151 0.103 0.156 
 (0.685) (0.353) (0.501) (0.313) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 324 324 324 324 
Adj.R2 0.269 0.207 0.217 0.245 
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Table 4 City-Industry Level Government quality and cash holdings 
The table presents results from regressing logged cash ratio on alternative government quality measures that are 
constructed from means of firm perceptions within an industry in a city. The other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the city and industry level) are used in computing p-value (in 
parentheses). The World Bank Survey (2006) only covers manufacturing firms and so the sample sizes in the 
table are smaller. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level 
(two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year and industry dummies are omitted for brevity.   
Y=Ln(cash ratio) 1 2 3 4 
City-industry level average of 
Property rights protection 
-0.006*** 
(0.000)    
 
 
   
City-industry level average of 
Lightness of tax burden  
-0.010** 
(0.047)   
  
 
  
City-industry level average of 
Government cleanliness   
-7.338*** 
(0.003)  
   
 
 
City-industry level average of 
Aggregate government quality    
-0.069*** 
(0.000) 
  
  
 NWC -0.419*** -0.404*** -0.412*** -0.425*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Firm size 0.021 0.011 0.012 0.018 
 (0.631) (0.789) (0.766) (0.691) 
Leverage -1.260*** -1.281*** -1.305*** -1.298*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.274** 0.285** 0.285** 0.301** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.010) 
Capex -1.425*** -1.418*** -1.355*** -1.366*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow risk 5.625*** 5.718*** 5.966*** 5.976*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow 0.901*** 0.873*** 0.866*** 0.891*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dividend payout (0/1) 0.317*** 0.303*** 0.299*** 0.309*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidy 5.731 5.114 5.096 4.981 
 (0.288) (0.332) (0.335) (0.338) 
Ownership wedge 0.167 0.328 0.286 0.159 
 (0.680) (0.380) (0.428) (0.670) 
Private (0/1) 0.228*** 0.198** 0.195** 0.222** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) (0.012) 
Lines of credit 0.153 0.172* 0.155 0.160 
 (0.118) (0.096) (0.140) (0.115) 
Private credit/GDP 0.092 0.094 0.107 0.092 
 (0.367) (0.503) (0.443) (0.449) 
GDP per capita 0.036 0.086 0.089 0.075 
 (0.566) (0.176) (0.198) (0.286) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,980 2,004 2,004 1,980 
Adj.R2 0.208 0.193 0.196 0.209 
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 Table 5 
Government quality and financial constraints: investment sensitivity to cash flow 
 
The table shows how government quality lowers the investment sensitivity to cash flow. The dependent variable 
is capital expenditure/year-beginning assets. The other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Robust standard 
errors (clustered at the city level) are used in computing p-value (in parentheses). *, **, ***: statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of 
the constant, year and industry dummies are omitted for brevity.  
 
Y= Capxt/assetst-1 1 2 3 4 
Cash flow 0.290*** -0.004 0.049 0.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.924) (0.183) (0.000) 
Property rights protection 0.002*    
 (0.056)    
Lightness of tax burden  0.012   
  (0.178)   
Government cleanliness   0.004  
   (0.176)  
Aggregate government quality    0.001* 
 
   (0.056) 
Property rights protection * Cash flow -0.031***    
 (0.000)    
Lightness of tax burden * Cash flow 
 -0.208**   
 
 (0.017)   
Government cleanliness *Cash flow   
  -0.037*  
 
  (0.099)  
Aggregate government quality * Cash flow 
   -0.016*** 
 
   (0.001) 
Q 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.483) (0.730) (0.663) (0.541) 
Lines of credit 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  3,060 3,060 3,060 3,060 
Adj.R2 0.171 0.169 0.168 0.170 
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Table 6 
An alternative measure of financial constraints: cash sensitivity to cash flow  
 
The table shows how government quality mitigates financial constraints measured by the sensitivity of cash to cash 
flows. The dependent variable is change in cash ratio. The other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Robust 
standard errors (clustered at the city level) are used in computing p-value (in parentheses). *, **, ***: statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of the 
constant, year and industry dummies are omitted for brevity.  
 
Y = ∆cash ratio 1 2 3 4 
Cash flow 0.605*** -0.153 0.153** 0.342*** 
 (0.000) (0.103) (0.049) (0.000) 
Property rights protection*Cash flow -0.086***    
 (0.000)    
Lightness of tax burden*Cash flow  -0.446**   
  
(0.032) 
  
Government cleanliness*Cash flow     -0.172***  
   
(0.006) 
 
Aggregate government quality*Cash flow    -0.051*** 
    
(0.000) 
Property rights protection  -0.003**    
 (0.028)    
Lightness of tax burden  
 
-0.020* 
  
  
(0.077) 
  
Government cleanliness   
 
-0.005 
 
  
 
(0.239) 
 
Aggregate government quality    
 
-0.002** 
   
 
(0.039) 
Firm size 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capex -0.338*** -0.332*** -0.331*** -0.335*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔNWC -0.425*** -0.420*** -0.425*** -0.425*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Short-term debt -0.276*** -0.261*** -0.267*** -0.272*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,060 3,060 3,060 3,060 
Adj.R2 0.227 0.214 0.218 0.225 
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Table 7 Corporate cash holdings and government quality: SOEs vs. Private firms 
The table shows how the effect of government quality measures on firms’ cash holdings differs in SOEs and private 
firms (based on ultimate ownership). The dependent variable is logged cash ratio. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the city level) are used in computing p-value (in parentheses). *, **, 
***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. The 
coefficients of the constant, year and industry dummies are omitted for brevity. 
 
Y=Ln(cash ratio) 1 2 
Aggregate government quality -0.051*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Aggregate government quality*Private -0.041* -0.040* 
 
(0.099) (0.094) 
Private (0/1) 0.335* 0.344** 
 (0.086) (0.013) 
NWC 
 
-0.593*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Firm size 
 
0.016 
 
 
(0.670) 
Leverage 
 
-1.294*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Q 
 
0.223*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Capex 
 
-0.707** 
 
 
(0.035) 
Cash flow risk 
 
6.127*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Cash flow 
 
1.253*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Dividend payout (0/1) 
 
0.336*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Subsidy 
 
1.555 
 
 
(0.734) 
Ownership wedge 
 
0.159 
 
 
(0.496) 
Lines of credit 
 
0.108 
 
 
(0.253) 
Private credit/GDP 
 
0.027 
 
 
(0.852) 
GDP per capita 
 
0.112 
 
 
(0.135) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes 
N 3,073 3,001 
Adj.R2 0.081 0.266 
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Table 8 
Government quality and financing channels   
 
This table reports the results from regressing access to finance (bank loan and accounts payable) on government quality. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the city level) are used in computing 
p-value (in parentheses). *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level 
(two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year and industry dummies are omitted for brevity.  
 
Y= Bank Loan Bank Loan Accounts payable 
Aggregate government quality 0.004** 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.859) 
0.002*** 
(0.007) 
Q -0.009** -0.019** -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.034) (0.822) 
Agg. government quality*Q 
 
0.003* 
(0.090)  
Firm size 0.005 0.005 0.007* 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.093) 
Industry median leverage 0.376** 0.375** 0.085** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.042) 
Cash flow -0.214*** -0.213*** 0.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth -0.004 -0.004 0.010** 
 (0.478) (0.489) (0.024) 
Private credit/GDP -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.862) (0.889) (0.843) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,073 3,073 3,073 
Adj.R2 0.592 0.593 0.308 
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Table 9 
Testing “the twin agency problem” 
This table reports the regression results regarding the impact of “the twin agency problem” on cash holdings. The 
dependent variable is logged cash ratio. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the city level) are used in computing p-value (in parentheses). *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year and industry dummies 
are omitted for brevity. 
Y=Ln(cash ratio) 1 2 
Ownership wedge 0.631* 0.524* 
 (0.071) (0.085) 
AGQ>sample median (0/1) (High AGQ) -0.144* -0.153* 
 (0.073) (0.086) 
High AGQ * Ownership wedge -1.042** -0.814* 
 (0.037) (0.092) 
NWC -0.623*** -0.614*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.025 0.014 
 (0.492) (0.712) 
Leverage -1.343*** -1.324*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Q 0.229*** 0.215*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex -0.710** -0.688** 
 (0.033) (0.039) 
Cash flow risk 6.158*** 6.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow 1.239*** 1.229*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend payout (0/1) 0.340*** 0.324*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidy 2.323 1.549 
 (0.618) (0.757) 
Private (0/1) 0.130** 0.134** 
 (0.045) (0.018) 
Line of Credit 0.105 0.099 
 (0.265) (0.329) 
Private credit/GDP 
 0.022 
 
 (0.855) 
GDP per capita 
 0.087 
 
 (0.217) 
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes 
N 3,001 3,001 
Adj.R2 0.256 0.260 
 
 
